Abstract-A relay network in which a source wishes to convey a confidential message to a legitimate destination with the assistance of trusted relays is considered. In particular, cooperative beamforming and user selection techniques are applied to protect the confidential message. The secrecy rate (SR) and secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the network are investigated first, and a tight upper bound for the SR and an exact formula for the SOP are derived. Next, asymptotic approximations for the SR and SOP in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime are derived for two different schemes: 1) cooperative beamforming and 2) multiuser selection. Furthermore, a new concept of cooperative diversity gain, namely, adapted cooperative diversity gain (ACDG), which can be used to evaluate the security level of a cooperative relaying network, is investigated. It is shown that the ACDG of cooperative beamforming is equal to the conventional cooperative diversity gain of traditional multiple-input single-output networks, while the ACDG of the multiuser scenario is equal to that of traditional single-input multiple-output networks.
to physical layer security (PLS) exploits the random fading of wireless channels. Although the information theoretic ideas behind PLS were first introduced by Wyner in his seminal work [3] many years ago, it is only recently that it has attracted the wide attention of the academic and industrial research community in wireless communications. The emergence of PLS has certainly created the need for new signal processing methods, channel modeling, and communication designs. From the information-theoretic perspective, the secrecy guarantee of wireless networks in the presence of eavesdroppers mainly relies on a metric called the secrecy rate (SR), which is the capacity difference between the legitimate channel, i.e., that of the intended user, and malicious channel, i.e., that of an eavesdropper [4] .
To deal with vulnerability to eavesdroppers, numerous studies have been conducted, e.g., [5] [6] [7] and references therein. These studies cover many different system models of wireless networks such as cooperative wiretap channels (e.g., [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] ), wiretap channels without cooperative nodes (e.g., [6] , [25] ), and cognitive radio networks (e.g., [5] ). Notably, relays allow the benefits of range extension and distributed diversity, and thus there is a great deal of interest in the exploitation of cooperative nodes for PLS. And it has been shown that node cooperation in cooperative wireless networks (CWNs) is an effective way to improve PLS [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . It allows single antenna nodes to enjoy the benefits of multiple-antenna systems and is an attractive low cost solution. So far, a variety of techniques have been offered to guarantee secure transmission via CWNs; for instance, relay selection techniques [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] and jamming methods [9] , [10] , [16] [17] [18] . Meanwhile, the design of beamforming techniques for communication security via CWNs has also been considered in [9] [10] [11] and [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . In addition, hybrid schemes combining different techniques have been proposed; for instance, the combination of relaying for retransmission and jamming for eavesdropping attacks has been considered in [22] and [23] . Furthermore, in [20] , the security issue is also discussed for a large scale multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) relaying system to get insight into the limitations of PLS when the number of relays approaches infinity. In short, the existing ideas for improving the security level in CWNs are relatively diverse.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, previous works have not investigated the impact of both cooperative beamforming and user selection on the security level of multiuser cooperative relaying networks. We are therefore motivated to examine the security level of such networks when cooperative beamforming is applied in parallel with user selection. Among the above-mentioned works on PLS in CWNs, closely related to 0090-6778 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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our work are the contributions in [19] [20] [21] [22] . However, here we use cooperative beamforming or user selection techniques for security enhancement, whereas [19] [20] [21] do not account for multiple users. It should also be noted that there are other system models in [24] [25] [26] similar to our work. However, [24] does not discuss multiple users, while [25] does not use cooperative nodes, and [26] does not take security issue into account. Moreover, [22] and [25] consider either cooperative beamforming or user selection only.
To evaluate the secure performance of a CWN, typical metrics such as secrecy rate (SR) [8] [9] [10] and secrecy outage probability (SOP) [11] , [13] [14] [15] , [20] are usually considered. Besides these two metrics, there is also another metric used to qualify the secure performance in the literature [12] , which is defined in a similar way to traditional diversity gain. It is well known that traditional space/time/frequency diversity techniques are not concerned with security issues [27] . As such, the concept of traditional diversity gain seems inappropriate for studying security aspects of wireless networks. To help quantify the secure performance, [12] first introduced the notion of intercept event (i.e., when SR is negative), and then presented a new concept of cooperative diversity gain (we shall call it adapted cooperative diversity gain (ACDG)), which relies on the intercept probability of the intercept event.
To be more precise, the ACDG defines the rate of decrease of the intercept probability with the increase of relative channel power gain of the destination on a log-log scale. This new concept quantifies how the secure performance increases with the ACDG. Due to the similarity of the ACDG to the conventional notion of diversity as well as the relevance of the ACDG to secure networks, we are motivated to examine it thoroughly.
In this paper, we evaluate the secure performance of a CWN in the presence of an eavesdropper. We divide our system model into two scenarios, namely, i) a system model with a single relay and multiple users, and ii) a system model with multiple relays and a single user. In both cases, the presence of an eavesdropper, which is another known user but not a desired destination, is assumed. The first case corresponds to a virtual SIMOSE (i.e., single-input multiple-output channel in the presence of a single eavesdropper), then the second scenario is seen as virtual MISOSE (i.e., multiple-input single-output channel in the presence of a single eavesdropper). Finding exact expressions for the ergodic SRs for the general case of multiple relays and multiple destinations is difficult. To circumvent this difficulty, we derive upper bounds on the quantities and asymptotic expressions at high transmit power. In addition, we analyze the ergodic SR of the proposed network for the case of large numbers of relays. We then derive the SOPs for the SIMOSE and the MISOSE cases. Finally, we borrow the concept of [12] to introduce the ACDG, and thereby quantify the secure performance of the proposed system. Furthermore, we show that the ACDG of a virtual SIMOSE (or MISOSE) system is equal to the diversity gain of a SIMO (or MISO) system. In particular, the ACDG is seen to be more compatible with secure networks than conventional diversity gain because security is taken into account.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes a CWN with multiple relays, multiple destinations, and a single eavesdropper. In Section III, we We assume that both D and E are far enough from S but close enough to R so that they are only capable of receiving the signal retransmitted from R. Additionally, the channel state information of the R-D n link as well as the R-E link is assumed to be available at R (e.g., [9] [10] [11] ). Next, we assume that each relay R m ∈ R is successful in demodulating and decoding the signal received during the first time slot (i.e., the DF protocol [30] ), and all relays (i.e., the set R) perform collaborative beamforming (e.g., see [19] , [22] , [24] and [31] ). R then forwards a weighted version of the retransmitted signal to D during the second time slot. The retransmitted signal is also intercepted by the malicious node E. Thus, the signals received at a certain D n and E during the second time slot are, respectively, given by
where x is the signal retransmitted by R (assuming that E{x} = 0 and
channel gain vector, and
To proceed, we assume that all relays in R collaborate with each other to design the beamforming vector w. Meanwhile, all destinations in D also collaborate to select a certain D n as a representative of D in order to receive the signal from R. Admittedly, the integration of these two cooperative techniques will help improve significantly the security level of the proposed system thanks to the increase in diversity at R and D.
Regarding the use of the beamforming scheme, the beamforming vector w is designed according to the channel between R and D * , in which D * is the selected D that has the strongest link between R and itself. Mathematically, we have
Let be the instantaneously received SNR at D * for the signal retransmitted by R in the second time slot. We obtain from (1) that
where
γ R |h R m D n | 2 be a sum of independent and identically distributed
. By definition of , we have = max n=1,...,N X n . Thus, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of can be readily deduced from [32] as follows:
and
Similarly, let be the instantaneously received SNR at the eavesdropper for the signal retransmitted by R in the second time slot. We obtain from (2) that
It is apparent that SNR appears in (9) as a function of two random vectors h RD * and h RE . Conditioning on h RD * , we have
leading to |h RD * ∼ Exp
as a result. 1 Note that |h RD * is equivalent to | and is a function of h RD * only. Thus, we shall use | in place of |h RD * .
III. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
In this section, we will study the ergodic SR for the system proposed in Section II. However, analyzing the general case with M ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2 is difficult. In order to simplify our analysis, we shall mainly examine the following three scenarios:
• SIMOSE: M = 1 and N ≥ 2.
• MISOSE: M ≥ 2 and N = 1.
• Large scale MIMOSE: M → ∞ and finite N . For the first two cases, we derive tight upper bounds as well as asymptotic expressions for the ergodic SR. Moreover, exact expression for the ergodic SR is found in the third case.
In order to proceed, we first recall that the channel capacities of the links R-D * and R-E in nat/s/Hz are, respectively, given by
Thus, the achievable SR in nat/s/Hz can be defined as [4] 
The ergodic SR of the proposed system in the general case (i.e., for a MIMOSE system) is given by
in which the term A can be expressed as (15) and the term B can be expressed as
where the last equality is obtained with the help of [29, Eq. (4.331.2)].
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14), we obtain
Unfortunately the expectation
in (17) cannot be found in closed-form. We therefore aim at finding an upper bound on the ergodic SR as follows:
where the inequality follows from the fact that
u du is a decreasing function. Lemma 1. At high γ R , the asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR, defined as C ∞ , is also that of the upper bound. In other words, we have
Proof: See Appendix A.
A. SIMOSE Wiretap Channel
In this subsection, we present an upper bound on and an asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR for the SIMOSE case. These results are given in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
Theorem 1: In the case of SIMOSE, an upper bound on the ergodic SR is given by
Proof: When M = 1, the PDF of in (8) reduces to
Then, the expected values in (18) can be, respectively, calculated as follows:
Finally, substituting (22) and (23) into (18) yields (20) .
To facilitate the analysis of the asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR, we now state Proposition 1, which will be applied to the proof of Corollary 1.
Proposition 1: If a and b are finite numbers, then
Proof: Using the Taylor series expansion for the function
Corollary 1: In the case of SIMOSE, an asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR is given by
Proof: Following Lemma 1, at high γ R , the asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR is given by
Finally, applying Proposition 1 to the limit on the right-hand side (RHS) of (27), we arrive at (26) and complete the proof.
B. MISOSE Wiretap Channel
Similar to the previous subsection, we now present an upper bound on and an asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR for the MISOSE case through Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.
Theorem 2: In the case of MISOSE, an upper bound on the ergodic SR is given by
where the function I(α, m)
Proof: When N = 1, the PDF of in (8) reduces to
Thus, the expected values in (18) can be, respectively, calculated as follows:
where (a) follows from Proposition 2 (see Appendix B); and (b) is obtained by using [29, Eq. (6.228.2) ]. Finally, substituting (32) and (33) into (18) yields (28) . Corollary 2: In the case of MISOSE, an asymptotic expression for the ergodic SR is given by
Proof: Again following Lemma 1, at high γ R , we have C ∞ = lim γ R →∞ C upper . Upon examining (28), we can see that taking the limit of C upper relies only on taking the limits of the expressions C 1 (γ R ) and C 2 (γ R ). These limits are calculated as follows:
where (a) follows Proposition 1. And
where (b) is obtained by first substituting (70) from Appendix B into (29) and then simplifying the expression. Finally, taking the limit of (28) with the aid of (35)- (36), we readily obtain the desired result (34).
C. Analysis for Large Scale MIMOSE Relaying Systems
Unlike both SIMOSE and MISOSE scenarios discussed above, in this subsection we consider a limiting scenario with a very large number of relays (i.e., M → ∞) and a moderate number of users (i.e., finite N ) to get insight into the ergodic SR of the proposed system [20] .
Based on this large-scale MIMO relaying system in the presence of an eavesdropper, we now derive the ergodic SR and state the following theorem:
Theorem 3: For the proposed system, when the number of relays is very large, i.e. M → ∞, the ergodic SR converges to
Proof: Similarly as in [33] , we apply the law of large numbers [34] to (4) 
Applying the Lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem, we have
where dist → denotes convergence in distribution as M → ∞. Employing the two convergence properties (38)-(39), we obtain the convergence of as
Finally, the ergodic SR of the proposed system with very large M is derived as
Applying integration by parts to the integral in the last equality and then manipulating the RHS, we easily arrive at (37) and complete the proof.
Observation: It is clear that Corollaries 1 and 2 provide better insight into the influence of the ratio R D / R E on the ergodic SR. Of course, the asymptotic expressions for the ergodic SR strictly depend on this ratio when γ R is very large. Meanwhile, Theorem 3 gives us a relatively compact expression for the ergodic SR in the MIMOSE case with large M and moderate N .
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we present the SOP, which is defined as the probability that the instantaneous SR is below a threshold value . The SOP will be derived for two cases: SIMOSE systems and MISOSE systems.
The SOP of the proposed system in the general case (i.e., for a MIMOSE system) is given by
where the last equality follows from the fact that F | (e − (1 + θ) − 1) = 0 where θ ≤ e − 1. On recalling that |h RD * ↔ | leads to | ∼ Exp(
), we can proceed to formulate (42) as
f (θ )dθ
where the integral G( ) is defined as
A. SIMOSE Wiretap Channel
Theorem 4: In the case of SIMOSE, the SOP can be written as
Proof: When M = 1, the CDF of in (7) reduces to
Moreover, by substituting (21) into (44), G( ) can be calculated as follows:
Finally, using (46) and substituting (47) into (43), we arrive at the SOP shown in (45).
Corollary 3:
In the case of SIMOSE, an asymptotic expression for P out at high γ R (γ R → ∞) is obtained by taking the limit of (45), i.e.,
B. MISOSE Wiretap Channel
Theorem 5: In the case of MISOSE, the SOP can be written as
Proof: When N = 1, the CDF of in (7) reduces to
Moreover, by substituting (31) into (44), G( ) can be calculated as follows:
where β Corollary 4: In the case of MISOSE, an asymptotic expression for P out at high γ R (γ R → ∞) is obtained by taking the limit of (49), i.e.,
Observation: To evaluate the SOP at high γ R , we can use the simple expressions shown in Corollaries 3 and 4 rather than the exact expressions shown in Theorems 4 and 5.
V. ADAPTED COOPERATIVE DIVERSITY GAIN
Inspired by the work in [12] , in this section, we present the ACDG for two scenarios: SIMOSE systems and MISOSE systems. According to [12] , the conventional concept of cooperative diversity gain is inappropriate to study security issues in CWNs. Instead, a new concept of cooperative diversity gain, namely, the ACDG, is defined in a manner similar to the conventional one.
Before defining the ACDG, we first state that an intercept event occurs when the channel capacity of the link R-D * becomes less than that of the link R-E, i.e., C D * < C E . The intercept probability is then given by
We next define λ as the ratio of the average channel gain of the link R-D * to that of the link R-E, i.e.,
Based on the intercept probability P int and the ratio λ, we finally define the ACDG as
Herein, the similarity between the concept of the ACDG and the conventional definition of diversity can be easily recognized. From the intercept probability point of view, the correlation between the secure metric P int and the ratio λ can be examined. In this way, the ACDG d is viewed as the key factor that affects the slope of the P int curve to enhance communication reliability. In the following, we will examine the ACDG for two cases: i) SIMOSE and ii) MISOSE wiretap channels.
A. SIMOSE Wiretap Channel
Theorem 6: When M = 1 and N ≥ 1, the ACDG of the proposed system is equal to d = N .
Proof: Substituting (21) into (53) and then introducing t θ/ (γ R R D ), we can rewrite (53) as
Moreover, ϒ 1 (t) can be expanded as
in some neighborhood of t = 0 + . Now, in order to investigate the asymptotic behavior of the integral in (56) we apply Watson's lemma [35, Lemma 1.2] and write
Finally, the ACDG of the proposed system with M = 1 and N ≥ 1 can be derived as
This result reveals that P int decreases inversely with N , and therefore the security performance is improved by increasing N . This completes the proof.
B. MISOSE Wiretap Channel
Theorem 7: When N = 1 and M ≥ 1, the ACDG of the proposed system is equal to d = M.
Proof: Substituting (31) into (53) and then introducing t θ/ (γ R R D ), we can rewrite (53) as
Moreover, ϒ 2 (t) can be expanded as
in some neighbourhood of t = 0 + . Therefore, Watson's lemma is applicable to (60) and we can express
Finally, the ACDG of the proposed system with N = 1 and M ≥ 1 can be written as
This result reveals that P int decreases inversely with M, therefore the security performance is improved by increasing M. This completes the proof.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section gives some numerical examples to verify the analysis presented in Sections III-V, and illustrate the key behaviors of the system when different network parameters are varied. Without loss of generality, N 0 is set to 0 dB, and so γ R is referred to as P R .
In Figs. 2 and 3 , the mean channel powers of the links R m -D n and R m -E are set to R D = 2.5 and R E = 4 respectively. Fig. 2 considers the proposed system with M = 1 and N = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, whereas Fig. 3 considers the proposed system with M = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and N = 1. For each figure, we observe that the upper bound gets closer to the ergodic SR as γ R (or P R ) increases from 0 dB to 30 dB. This can be easily explained by assessing that E 1 1+θ
with large enough θ due to the fact that θ = γ R h R D * 2 . On this observation, the upper bound can be referred to as an approximation to the ergodic SR at high γ R . Moreover, the asymptotic line agrees exactly with both the simulation and the upper bound at high γ R , which confirms again the correctness of our analyses. In Fig. 4 , we show the ergodic SR for the case of a very large MIMO relaying system. Although M is assumed to approach infinity, we illustrate a more practical scenario with M = {50, 100, 150}. For each given M, we consider N = {1, 2, 3} for comparison. Likewise, we choose R D = 2.5 and R E = 4. The figure shows the convergence of the ergodic SR (as stated in Theorem 3) in the case that M is much greater than N . When the ratio M N becomes larger, the agreement between the simulation and the analysis becomes closer. As expected, when N = 1 and M = 50, the simulated points lie slightly lower than the analytical curve because the analysis is intended for M → ∞. However, they nearly coincide with each other when N = 1 and M = 150. This suggests that exact agreement is achievable when N = 1 and M is very large.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the secrecy outage probabilities in two scenarios of interest, the proposed system with M = 1 (i.e., the SIMOSE scenario), and the proposed system with N = 1 (i.e., the MISOSE scenario). We also choose R D = 2.5, and R E = 4. The outage threshold is chosen to be = 0.5 ln 2 (in nat/s/Hz). As we can see from these figures, when γ R increases from 0 dB to 40 dB, the secrecy outage probabilities decrease slightly, while increasing N (the SIMOSE scenario) or M (the MISOSE scenario) improves the system performance more significantly. These observations suggest that increasing the number of relaying/destination nodes is a much more effective strategy than increasing the transmit power at the relays.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the intercept probabilities versus the ratio λ =
R D RE
in two scenarios of interest, namely, SIMOSE and MISOSE. For each of these figures, we can see that the worst case occurs when M = 1 and N = 1, while the intercept probability decreases strongly with the number of nodes and λ. As proved in Theorems 6 and 7, the number of nodes is equal to the ACDG, which serves to shift the intercept probability curves to the left and therefore improves the reliability of the proposed system from the security point of view. Furthermore, these figures reveal striking similarities of the ACDG to the conventional cooperative diversity gain. As such, the concept of the ACDG seems to be more compatible with security of wireless networks than the concept of traditional diversity gain. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the use of cooperative beamforming and user selection for relay network security. First, we have analyzed the ergodic SRs for three cases: SIMOSE systems (M = 1, N ≥ 2), MISOSE systems (M ≥ 2, N = 1), and very large scale MIMOSE systems (M → ∞, finite N ). Bounds on and asymptotic expressions for the ergodic SR for the first two cases, and an exact expression for the ergodic SR at very large M for the third case have been derived. Secondly, we have evaluated the security performance for SIMOSE and MISOSE systems in terms of outage probability. We have analyzed the ACDG which is similar to the conventional cooperative diversity gain, for SIMOSE and MISOSE systems. The validity of our expressions have been verified through simulation results. For future work, we plan to investigate the more generic case of the proposed network and the effects of other factors, e.g. imperfect channel state information. 
First, we rewrite the left hand side (LHS) of (64) as
dz (65) where f (θ ) is given in (8) and f h RD * 2 (z) = γ R f (γ R z) due to the relation in (6) . Additionally, it is easy to confirm that f h RD * 2 (z) is no longer dependent on γ R , while E 1
is an increasing function of γ R . We therefore come to the conclusion thath γ R (z) is increasing in γ R ≥ 0, is bounded from above and has the limit
Following these observations, we have
Because the RHS of (67) is independent of γ R , we can also rewrite it as the limit of a constant, i.e., (67) becomes
and the proof is complete. 
B. Integral

